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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Certiorari was granted in this case on petition to
this Court.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Petitioner was suspended from the Utah Highway
Patrol with certain conditions for possible reinstatement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CERTIORARI
Petitioner seeks to have a portion of his suspension order modified,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a hearing the Highway Patrol Civil Service
Commission entered Findings of Fact and its Decision (R 23
through 26) and ordered "„„,the removal of Roy M, Helm from
the position of Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol
effective December 31, 1975, with the following provisio:
"CONDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION:
Because of the long and dedicated service Superintendent Roy M* Helm has rendered to the State
of Utah as a member of the Highway Patrol, and
his advancement from a Radio Operator to his
present position of Superintendent, and because
he has acknowledged he has an alcohol problem,
we recommend he be given reasonable time to
rehabilitate himself...and if he successfully
overcomes his problems, he be considered for
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reinstatement in the Utah Highway Patrol,
at a rating or rank to be determined by the
Commissioner of Public Safety,* (R 26),
Exception was taken to the portion pertaining to
any discretion to be exercised by the Commissioner of Public
Safety, and an Amended Decision and Findings entered (R 27-28)
which modified the previous decision as follows *
"Based upon its Findings entered on December 26,
1975, and the foregoing, and based upon the merits
of the Objections of Roy M, Helm, the Commission
enters as its amended decision, the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Roy M, Helm is removed
as Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol and
is indefinitely suspended from any employment
of the Utah Highway Patrol, effective December 31,
1975. Provided Roy M, Helm can resolve to the
satisfaction of the Commission his alcohol prob^
lem, or other related problems which impair either
his fitness or qualification to serve as a member
of the Utah Highway Patrol, he may apply to the
Commission for reinstatement as a member of the
Utah Highway Patrol, Provided the Commission
determines that Roy M, Helm has successfully
rehabilitated himself so that he again qualifies
for service in the Utah Highway Patrol, the Commission shall direct the Commissioner of Public
Safety to reinstate Roy M, Helm to the service
of the Utah Highway Patrol, but at a rating or
rank and a position to be determined by the Com*missioner of Public Safety,
Dated this 7th day of January, 1976,"

(R 28),

From the reference to "rating or rank and a position to be determined by the Commissioner of^Public Safety"
but not the portion wherein the ^Commission shall direct the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Commissioner of Public Safety to reinstate,, *,f a petition for
writ of certiorari was filed with this Court for a review of
that portion of the Amended Decision,
POINT ON APPEAL
THE HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED
IN LEAVING ANY DISCRETION TO THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AS TO RATING, RANK OR POSITION TO BE GIVEN TO A REINSTATED
EMPLOYEE OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL,
No cross^petition has been sought by the Commissioner
of Public Safety in this case challenging the non^excepted to
portion of the Amended Decision which, thereforer must stand,
Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P,

In its discretion the Commission provided

for petitioner's possible reinstatement after a proper showing
of rehabilitation CR 27^28).
The purpose of Civil Service Commissions is to separate politics from job performance, tenure, promotion, discharge, and punishment.

The general rule is set forth in

15 Am. Jur. 2d 464, Civil Service;
"§1.

Purpose of civil service laws,
... The civil service system rests on the
principle of application of the merit system instead of the spoils system in the matter of appointment and tenure of office. Civil service laws
are not penal in nature, but are designed to eradicate the system of making appointments primarily
from political considerations with its attendant
evils, to eliminate as far as practicable the
element of partisanship and personal favoritism
in making appointments, to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of
appointments, and to prevent discrimination in
appointments to public service based on any consideration other than fitness to perform its duties.
While security of tenure in office is an important
object
of the
civil
service
and it has
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
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Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

been said that civil service legislation was
enacted for the security of the faithful employee
by giving him permanence of employment, at least
for the period prescribed by law, and to free
such employee from the fear of political and
personal prejudicial reprisal, civil service
laws were intended as a protection for the public as well as for the individual employee,
Stated otherwise, civil service was not established
for the sole benefit of public employees. In
fact, it has been said that the primary purpose
of civil service is to enable state, county,
and municipal governments to render more efficient services to the public by enabling them
to obtain efficient public servants."
Further, at page 494:
"§33. Governmental regulation of separation
or demotion, generally.
... One of the purposes of civil service laws
is to take from the appointing officer the
right of arbitrary removal of an appointee?12
absent such laws a public employee has no protection against suspension and removal and he
may be suspended or removed with or without
cause.13.m mw
This rule has been adopted by Utah in 67-13-2, Utah Code Ann.,
as amended, as follows:
"Establishment of state system - Purpose of act Principles recognized. - (a) The general purpose of this act is to establish for the state
a system of personnel administration based on
merit principles and scientific methods govern^
ing the appointment, promotion, transfer, layoff,
removal, discipline and welfare of its civil
employees."
There is adequate case authority supporting the
above statements of these general rules and statutory rule of
law.
Although the State of Utah has not had occasion to
emphasize these
principles in its case law, other states have.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Gogerty v. Department of Institutions, 71 Wash, 2d 48,
426 P.2d 476 (1967), the Court first quotes a portion of its
civil service statute, which is almost an exact quotation
of the Utah statute examined above;
"To establish for the state a system of personnel administration based on merit principals
and scientific methods governing the appointment,
promotion, transfer, layoff, recruitment, retention, classification and pay plan, removal, discipline and welfare of its civil employees, and
other incidents of state employment." (Laws of
1961 of Wash,, Ch,l, RCW 41,06, at 426 P.2d 478)
The Court then goes on to say;
"This declared purpose is clearly within the
traditional principle of the merit system of
public employment, i,e. , the delimitation or
elimination of the spoils system in the matter
of the selection, appointment, discipline, and
discharge of civil employees, (426 P.2d at 478,
emphasis added.)
Clearly the purpose of Civil Service Legislation is
fairness in all aspects of employment.

Although Gogerty speci-

fically dealt with the alleged unfair suspension of an employee,
it is clear from the Court's language that the legislation is
a preventive measure to ensure that discrimination never
achieves a foothold in any aspect of Civil Service Employment.
The legislation is to have a prophylactic effect by, in fact,
preventing any discrimination from infiltrating the program
before it even has a chance to try to do so, " Herriott v. City
of Seattle, 81 Wash, 2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 at 109, (1972),

- 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Similarly in CivilService Commission of City of
Tucson v. Livingston, 22 Ariz, App. 183, 525 P.2d 949 (1974),
the Arizona Court recognized the dangers in allowing one man
the power to hire and to fire, or to promote and rate arbitrarily.
"One of the objectives of civil service laws
is to take from the appointing officer the right
of arbitrary removal of an appointee, Absent
such laws a public employee has no protection
against suspension and removal with or without
cause.* (525 P.2d at 952)
The courts and legislatures have recognized throughout
the recent history of civil service employment system the need
for standards to prevent arbitrary dismissal or political,
familial, or emotional hiring and have therefore insisted on
an impartial and fair system that functions absolutely to the
letter of the legislative mandate.

Burmingham v. Wilkinson,

239 Ala. 199, 194 So, 548; Fallon v. Nicholson, 136 Colo, 238,
316 P.2d 1054; People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 111, 44,
49 N.E. 229, error dismd. 170 U.S. 182, 42 L. Ed, 998, 18 S. Ct.
550; Gervais v. New Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 782, 77
So. 2d 393; People v. Mosher, 163 N,Y, 32, 57 N,E, 88; Stowe v,
Ryan, 135 Or. 371, 296 P. 856; Hawkes v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Review, 145 Pa, Super. 465, 21 A.2d 485; Knoxville v.
Smith, 176 Tenn. 73, 138 S.W.2d 422,

But legislatures have

not been content to simply allow for a right' of appeal when
an employee or prospective employee feels he has been treated
unfairly by a department head.

All Civil

Service Laws allow
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a department head freedom of choice within very narrow parameters.
"If it is assumed that the Civil Service
Amendment did not repeal the experience requirements of the statute, which expressly we do not
determine, it, nevertheless, is certain that
such amendment did confer upon the Civil Service
Commission, and upon it alone, the discretion
to ascertain the qualifications, fitness and
merit of all applicants under the classified
service,,.1* (People v. Harl, 109 Colo. 223,
124 P.2d 233 (1942). ~ ~ ~ .. .
Legislatures did not wish one man to administer the
system but instead created impartial panels of men to administer
an impartial and objective examination to determine ability,
fitness and merit.

In virtually every case in which the statute

specifically provides for a panel to ^rate" the applicants,
that statute is followed strictly.

Conover v. Board of Equali-

zation, 44 C.A, 2d 283, 112 P.2d 341 (1941); Vivian v. Bloom,
115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947).
The enforcing of that strict legislative directive
by the courts ensures the vitality and permanence of fairness
within the Civil Service System.

An objective competitive

test among applicants, based on an analysis of the position
sought for, provides for an impartial rating of men as to
their qualifications.

The program is administered by indivi-

duals who will not be directly responsible for the applicants'
work.

More importantly, the supervisor of the man who will

eventually be hired has absolutely no input into the ranking
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
of the applicants,
completely
eliminating
anyBYU.
prejudice,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

emotional, political, or otherwise, from the hiring process.
The system ensures that only qualified men will be hired,
Utah law follows this national trend implicitly.
Chapter 11, Utah Code Ann., entitled Highway Patrol Civil
Service, clearly defines who is to rate applicants.

Sec.

27-11-5 creates the Civil Service Commission associated with
the Highway Patrol,

Sec, 27^11-6 discusses the qualities of

impartiality that these men must have in "the selection of
efficient government personnel *

(emphasis added).

Sec.

27-11-7 provides that the chairman must be someone *who has
known sympathies with the merit system in government service.11
(emphasis added),

Sec, 27^11^8 provides that the Commission

will set the qualifying standards to be met and Sec, 27-11-10
indicates that it is the Commission who will indicate to the
apointing authority, in this case the Commissioner of Public
Safety, who does and does not qualify for a particular office;
"(a) The appointing authority must certify
to the Civil Service Commission the position or
positions to be filled in said State Highway
Patrol Department, stating the nature of the
duties to be performed by such appointee, and
any peculiar qualification necessary to the
filling of the position.
'(b) Upon receipt of such certificate, the
Civil Service Commission shall certify to the
appointing authority from its eligible list the
names of persons appearing thereon having the
three highest ratings appearing at the top of
such list." (emphasis added).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

In the face of the Utah Legislature^ mandate, the

pertinent case law and the very important policy considerations
inherent in the entire Civil Service System it is difficult to
understand the Civil Service Commission's order ^ "at a rating
or rank and position to be determined by the Commissioner of
Public Safety.11

That completely reverses the order of rating

as dictated by statute, and furthermore, it frustrates the
purposes of the Civil Service Porgram,

It is not because the

Commissioner has acted in a partial manner in the past or that
it appears eminent that he will be partial in the immediate
future that makes this order distasteful.

The order is repug-

nant because it impairs a system which guarantees to the public
that the Commissioner will never even be tempted to be partial.
The Commission cannot frustrate the system by delegating its
power to some other agency or person,

Hagerman v. Dayton,

147 Ohio St. 313, 34 Ohio Op. 238, 71 N.E,2d 246, 170 A.L.R. 99.
Under the circumstances, the Highway Patrol Civil
Service Commission was in error in its order of January 7, 1976,
When Mr. Helm has shown his complete dominance of his alcoholic
problem, he must be reinstated at a rating determined by the
Commission and not by the Commissioner of Public Safety.
CONCLUSION
Because the discretion as to "rating, rank or position" for reinstatement is being left to the Commissioner of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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petitioner respectfully submits that this portion c: :.>
A m e n d e d Decision Is contrary to the fair intent c - " ' 1
Service l a w s , a n d this Court should reverse the Aiaen^ea
Decision w i t h a directive order - - • -;e "-tah Highway Patrol
C:i1|;; rj ] S e r,i;: i i ce Commissi on
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Lion" for r e i n s t a t e m e n t determinatio:..
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Petitioner
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